Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary
Volume 42

Issue 2

Article 3

5-15-2022

May the Executive Branch Forgive Student Loan Debt Without
Further Congressional Action?
Colin Mark

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and
the President/Executive Department Commons

Recommended Citation
Colin Mark, May the Executive Branch Forgive Student Loan Debt Without Further Congressional Action?,
42 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 97 (2022)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol42/iss2/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

May the Executive Branch Forgive Student Loan Debt Without Further Congressional
Action?
Colin Mark

I.

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................98

II.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS
PROGRAMS…………………………………………………………………...…..103

III.

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FORGIVENESS OF STUDENT
LOANS......................................................................................................................110
A. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FORGIVENESS OF
STUDENT LOANS.............................................................................................111
B. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS TO FORGIVE STUDENT
LOANS................................................................................................................128
C. EMERGENCY STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS UNDER THE HEROES
ACT.....................................................................................................................136
D. TAX TREATMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORGIVENESS OF STUDENT
LOANS................................................................................................................138

IV.

VIABILITY OF A LITIGATION CHALLENGE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
FORGIVENESS OF STUDENT
LOANS......................................................................................................................140
A. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO ENJOINING ADMINISTRATIVE STUDENT
LOAN FORGIVENESS......................................................................................141
i. ARTICLE III STANDING......................................................................142
ii. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.....................................................................142
iii. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO SUITS BY STUDENT LOAN
SERVICERS……………………………………………………………146
iv. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO SUITS BY INVESTORS..................153
B. APA JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S AND
TREASURY’S STUDENT DEBT FORGIVENESS ACTIONS........................156

V.

CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................159

97

I.

INTRODUCTION
Over forty-three million U.S. borrowers owe $1.6064 trillion in federal student loans.1

Approximately twenty-five percent of student loan borrowers are struggling to repay or in
default,2 making student loans the form of household debt with the highest rate of delinquency. 3
This debt is particularly onerous because it is rarely dischargeable in bankruptcy.4
Federal student loans are divided among three flagship lending programs, administered
by the U.S. Department of Education (Department).5 Some $4.2 billion of this debt6 falls under
the Federal Perkins Loan Program (Perkins),7 which provided partial government funding for
higher education institutions to lend to their students.8 The Perkins program originated in the

Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, NAT’L STUDENT LOAN DATA SYS.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/PortfolioSummary.xls (last visited
Apr. 29, 2022) [hereinafter Portfolio Summary].
1

2

Jeffrey P. Naimon, Sasha Leonhardt, & Sarah B. Meehan, School of Hard Knocks: Federal Student
Loan Servicing and the Looming Federal Student Loan Crisis, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 259, 261 (2020).
3

Id. at 266.

4

See John P. Hunt, Consent to Student Loan Bankruptcy Discharge, 95 IND. L.J. 1137, 1144 (2020)
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)).
5

Portfolio Summary, supra note 1; see generally Hunt, supra note 4. Other student loan programs have
existed but are not reflected in the Department of Education’s report of its current student loan portfolio.
See Hunt, supra note 4, at 1145 & n.54 (discussing Health Education Assistance Loan program,
terminated in 1998, and TEACH Grants, which convert to loans in certain circumstances and noting the
Department of Education does not address these in portfolio reports).
6

Portfolio Summary, supra note 1.

7

20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa–1087ii (2018).

8

Id.
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1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA)9 and expired in 2017.10 Another $225.7 billion of
student debt11 falls under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP),12 under which
private lenders lent to students, “guaranty agencies” (state governments or nonprofit
organizations) guaranteed the loans, and the federal government insured the “guaranty
agencies.”13 FFELP originated in the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA)14 and operated until
Congress terminated it in 2010.15 As of 2020, the Department had taken over fifteen percent of
FFELP loans, while private parties held the rest of these loans.16 Finally, the remaining $1.3765
trillion of federal student loan debt17 falls under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program (Direct),18 under which the Department of Education lends directly to students.19 This

9

National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Hunt, supra note 4, at 1145.
10
11

Hunt, supra note 4, at 1145.
Portfolio Summary, supra note 1.

12

20 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1087 (2018).

13

Id.

14

Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 431, 79 Stat. 1219, 1245.

15

Hunt, supra note 4, at 1146.

16

See Luke Herrine, The Law and Political Economy of a Student Debt Jubilee, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 281,
296, 395 (2020).
17

Portfolio Summary, supra note 1.

18

20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a-1087j.

19

Hunt, supra note 4, at 1146.
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program originated in the Higher Education Amendments of 1992 20 and is the only ongoing
federal student lending program.21
The consequences of the U.S. student debt burden have galvanized support for federal
government forgiveness of some or all outstanding federal student loan debt. 22 President Biden
has pledged to seek partial forgiveness of student loan debt. 23 While Democrats in Congress have
introduced bills for forgiving some or all such debt,24 the Biden administration has come under
increasing pressure to pursue this forgiveness through administrative action. 25
Legal scholars, as well as progressive advocacy groups, have argued that the president
could legally forgive the entire federal student debt burden, including Perkins, FFELP, and
Direct loans, using solely administrative action. 26 On the other hand, in the last weeks of the

20

Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448, 569.

21

Hunt, supra note 4, at 1146.

22

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 282; Elizabeth Warren & Chuck Schumer, New Op-Ed: Why We,
Elizabeth Warren And Chuck Schumer, Believe The Biden-Harris Administration Should Cancel Up To
$50K In Student Debt On Day One, BLAVITY (Dec. 3, 2020, 11:27 PM), https://blavity.com/why-weelizabeth-warren-and-chuck-schumer-believe-the-biden-harris-administration-should-cancel-up-to-50kin-student-debt-on-dayone?_gl=1*xbxx0z*_ga*a1lDaWRPZ2FOVFVJX19pWnRKZHRkUDlkMkdQRHpEcUd0bi1xTnF6djV0
d3M1LS1OSEprSmVHNkVNN095YUNmaw..&category1=news&category2=opinion.
23

Josh Mitchell, Biden Plan to Forgive Student Debt Hinges on Democratic Control of Senate, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 14, 2020, 8:00 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-plan-to-forgive-student-debthinges-on-democratic-control-of-senate-11605358800.
24

See, e.g., Student Debt Cancellation Act of 2019, H.R. 3448, 116th Cong. (2019-2020); Student Loan
Debt Relief Act of 2019, H.R. 3887, 116th Cong. (2019–2020); see Herrine, supra note 16, at 341 & n.
152.
25

See Mitchell, supra note 23; Warren & Schumer, supra note 22.

26

See generally Herrine, supra note 16; Letter from Eileen Connor, Legal Dir., Legal Servs. Ctr. of Harv.
L. Sch., Deanne Loonin, Att’y, Legal Servs. Ctr. Of Harv. L. Sch., and Toby Merrill, Dir. Of Project on
Predatory Student Lending, Legal Servs. Ctr. Of Harv. L. Sch. To Senator Elizabeth Warren (Sept. 14,
2020) [hereinafter Letter to Senator Warren].; John Patrick Hunt, Jubilee Under Textualism, 48 J. LEGIS.
31 (2021).
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Trump administration, the Department of Education’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC)
opined27 that the Department of Education “[did] not have the statutory authority to cancel,
compromise, discharge, or forgive, on a blanket or mass basis, principal balances of student
loans, and/or to materially modify the repayment amounts or terms thereof.”28 The OGC opinion
letter does not bind the Biden administration, which is free to advance a different interpretation
of legal authorities.29 President Biden initially insisted that he would not pursue administrative
cancellation of $50,000 per debtor in student loans, explaining in part: “I don’t think I have the
authority.”30 However, on April 1, 2021, the White House announced that President Biden has
directed Education Secretary Miguel Cardona to prepare a new legal opinion addressing this
issue.31 Reports in late April 2022 indicated that President Biden was considering forgiving “at
least $10,000” in student loans per borrower through administrative action. 32
Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Ed., Off. of Gen. Couns. on Student Loan Principal Balance
Cancellation, Compromise, Discharge, and Forgiveness Authority to Betsy DeVos, Sec’y of Educ. (Jan.
12, 2021) [hereinafter Department of Education Letter].
27

28

Id. at 1; see also Email from David Bergeron, Senior Fellow, Ctr. For Am. Progress, to Luke Herrine,
Ph.D. in Law Candidate, Yale L. Sch. (June 18, 2019, 10:05) (on file with Luke Herrine) (cited in
Herrine, supra note 16, at 388 & n.314) (expressing skepticism that the Department of Education may
legally forgive performing student loans); Memorandum from Christopher Healy, Rsch. Assistant &
Harv. Law Sch. Class 2017, to Professor Howell Jackson, Steven Swig, & Mary Swig 6 (July 11, 2016)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Healy] (expressing same).
29
See Michael Stratford, Trump administration tries to hamstring Biden on student loan forgiveness,
POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2021, 6:23 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/13/trump-biden-studentloan-forgiveness-459085 (“The legal opinion is not necessarily binding on the Biden administration,
which could reverse or change its interpretation of the laws that govern federal student loans.”).
30

Zack Friedman, Biden: I Will Not Cancel $50,000 of Student Loans, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2021, 10:17
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2021/02/16/biden-i-will-not-forgive-50000-of-studentloans/?sh=1f51e0a9176e.
31

Annie Nova, Biden asks Education Secretary to See if He Can Legally Cancel Student Debt, CNBC
(Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/01/biden-administration-explores-options-for-cancelingstudent-debt.html.
32

Nancy Cook, Jarrell Dillard, & Emma Kinery, Biden Eyes Student-Loan Forgiveness Starting at
$10,000, BLOOMBERG (APR. 22, 2022, 12:11 PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202204-29/biden-eyes-targeted-student-loan-forgiveness-starting-at-10-000.
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This article interrogates the leading arguments that the Department of Education can
forgive all Perkins, FFELP, and Direct loan liability, without additional congressional
authorization. It highlights the likeliest stumbling blocks for such an administrative debt
forgiveness plan, as well as the leading arguments that comprehensive—or, at least, partial—
administrative student loan forgiveness might be within the authority of the Department of
Education. It also addresses whether federal courts would entertain a private lawsuit challenging
the Department’s authority if the Secretary of Education were to engage in broad-ranging student
loan forgiveness programs without further congressional action.
The short answer is that there is no short answer. The strength of the arguments for
executive authority to forgive student loans vary with the type of loan, the likelihood of recovery
from the student debtor, and the amount of forgiveness contemplated. 33
Part I catalogues the history of federal student loan programs, including forgiveness
programs established by statute and administrative actions that have facilitated limited student
loan forgiveness. Part II articulates the legal bases for the Department of Education’s power to
forgive some or all student loan debt and the criticisms of these proffered bases. 34 It considers
both the argument that the Department of Education has statutory authority to forgive student
loans and that any such forgiveness would represent a nonreviewable exercise of enforcement

33

For a synopsis of this argument, see Howell E. Jackson & Colin A. Mark, Executive Authority to
Forgive Student Loans Is Not So Simple, REGUL. REV. (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.theregreview.org/2021/04/19/jackson-mark-executive-authority-forgive-student-loans-notsimple/. For an analysis reaching a similar conclusion, see also Charlie Rose, Legal Assessment of Mass
Student Debt Cancellation (May 7, 2021) (on file with author) (“[T]he Secretary’s authority to “modify”
or “compromise” student loans under existing statutes and regulations appears limited to case-by-case
review and, in some cases, only to nonperforming loans.”).
34

For simplicity, this paper generally will not distinguish between powers conferred on or exercised by
the President, the Secretary of Education, and the Department of Education, and will refer to each of these
as powers of the Department of Education. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, with respect to the U.S.
Department of Treasury (Treasury).
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discretion. Part III analyzes the viability of litigation aimed at enjoining the implementation of
administrative forgiveness of student loans. It considers the procedural hurdles facing potential
plaintiffs and concludes that at least some plaintiffs are likely to reach the merits in a suit against
the Department of Education. It then considers how a federal court would likely receive the legal
arguments depending on the nature of the administrative student loan forgiveness actions
precipitating the suit.
II.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAMS
The federal government has introduced numerous student loan forgiveness programs

since the inception of federal student lending.35 These programs have varied in the scope of their
coverage and the degree of forgiveness they have conferred. 36 This section provides a brief
history of these federal student loan forgiveness programs.
The original 1958 NDEA, which created the program that in 1986 became Perkins,37
included the first federal student loan forgiveness program. 38 The NDEA provided for
forgiveness of public school teachers’ student loans at a rate of ten percent of the loan balance
per year, up to a maximum of fifty percent. 39 When Congress rechristened the Perkins program

35

See John R. Brooks & Adam J. Levitin, Redesigning Education Finance: How Student Loans Outgrew
the “Debt” Paradigm, 109 Geo L. J. 5, 21, 28, 30–33 (2020).
36

See id.

37

See Higher Education Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, Title IV, § 405(a), 100 Stat. 1268
(renaming loans to “Perkins Loans”).
See National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 205(b)(3), 72 Stat. 1580 (“[N]ot to
exceed 50 per centum of any such loan (plus interest) shall be canceled for service as a full-time teacher
in a public elementary or secondary school in a State, at the rate of 10 per centum of the amount of such
loan plus interest thereon, which was unpaid on the first day of such service, for each complete academic
year of such service . . . .”); Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 21. The current version of the program is
codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee.
38

39

National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 205(b)(3).
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in 1986, Congress also expanded the list of professions eligible for loan forgiveness to include
certain members of the Armed Forces of the United States, Peace Corps volunteers, and
volunteers under the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973.40 Congress expanded the program
to nurses, certain medical technicians, and certain child and family service agency employees in
1992;41 and to certain law enforcement officers, corrections officers, public defenders,
firefighters, faculty members of Tribal Colleges and Universities, librarians, library employees,
and speech-language pathologists in 2008. 42
In addition to the Perkins loan forgiveness programs, Congress authorized analogous
programs for holders of FFELP and Direct loans who work in particular fields.43 In 1992,
Congress authorized a “demonstration program” authorizing FFELP loan forgiveness for certain
teachers, Peace Corps and Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 volunteers, and nurses. 44 In
1998, Congress replaced this demonstration program with a partial loan forgiveness program for
holders of FFELP or Direct Loans who teach for five consecutive, complete school years. 45
Congress also authorized a demonstration program for partially forgiving FFELP and Direct
loans of certain child care providers.46 In 2008, Congress replaced this demonstration program
with a FFELP and Direct loan forgiveness program offering $2,000 of forgiveness per year, up to
a total of $10,000, on a “first-come, first-served basis,” contingent on “the availability of
40

Higher Education Amendments of 1986 § 405(a).

41
42

Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-325, Title IV, § 465, 100 Stat. 448.
Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, Title IV, § 465, 122 Stat. 3078.

43

See infra, text at notes 44–48.

44

Higher Education Amendments of 1992 Title IV, § 422 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1078-10).

45

Higher Education Amendments of 1998 Title IV, § 424.

46

Id. Title IV, § 425 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1078-11).
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appropriations,” to borrowers employed in certain enumerated professions.47 At that time,
Congress also created a FFELP, Direct, and Perkins loan forgiveness program for civil legal
assistance attorneys, authorizing forgiveness of $6,000 per year, up to a total of $40,000, on a
“first-come, first-served basis,” contingent on “the availability of appropriations.” 48
For debtors outside of these professions, prior to 1998, the primary student loan
forgiveness avenue for student borrowers was bankruptcy.49 For most of the history of student
loans, they were dischargeable in bankruptcy.50 However, Congress began curbing the ability to
discharge student debt in 1976, initially prohibiting discharge during the first five years after a
borrower’s repayments were first due, unless the loan represented an “undue hardship” on the
borrower.51 After a series of statutes further restricting student debtors’ recourse to bankruptcy,
in 1998, Congress imposed an undue hardship requirement for discharge of any public and

47

Higher Education Opportunity Act Title IV, § 430. The program is open to: early childhood educators;
nurses; foreign language specialists; librarians; certain teachers; child welfare workers; speech-language
pathologists and audiologists; school counselors; certain public sector employees; nutrition professionals;
medical specialists; mental health professionals; dentists; physical therapists; school administrators;
occupational therapists; and employees in the applied sciences, technology engineering or mathematics.
Id.
48

Id. Title IV, § 431 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1078-12).

49

See Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 29.

50

Id.

51

See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, sec. 127(a), § 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)); see also Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 29.

105

nonprofit student loans, stipends, scholarships and educational benefits, at any time. 52 In 2005,
Congress expanded this bar to student loans of every kind.53
The foreclosing of student debtors’ recourse to bankruptcy spurred an uptick in demand
for formal student debt forgiveness programs. 54 Congress created the first “Income-Contingent
Repayment” (ICR) plan in 1993. 55 This program allowed student loan borrowers to replace fixed,
standardized loan service payments with payments based on a measurement of their income, as
well as to receive debt forgiveness over time. 56 As ICR arrived while student loans were still
ultimately dischargeable in bankruptcy, the initial ICR program did not attract many student
debtors.57 However, the program provided the statutory hook for administrative programs
introduced during the Obama administration. 58
In 2007, following the total exclusion of student debtors from bankruptcy proceedings
absent undue hardship, Congress established the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF)59 and

52

See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971, 112 Stat. 1581, 1837; see also
Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 29.
53

See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119
Stat. 23, 59.
54

See Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 30.

55

See Student Loan Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–66, sec. 4021, § 455(d)(1)(D), (e), 107 Stat.
312, 341 (enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993); see also Brooks & Levitin,
supra note 35, at 28.
56
Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 28.
57

See id.

58

See id. at 28, 32.

59

See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, sec. 401, § 455, 121 Stat. 784, 800
(2007).
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Income-Based Repayment (IBR (2007)) 60 programs.61 PSLF promised borrowers working in
public service jobs the opportunity to receive loan forgiveness after 120 monthly payments. 62 In
2017, the first participants in the PSLF program completed 120 payments and became eligible
for loan forgiveness.63 However, in the first two years after borrowers became eligible for PSLF
forgiveness, student loan servicers approved fewer than one percent (845 out of 90,962) of
debtor applicants.64 In response to this rejection rate, in 2018, Congress enacted the Temporary
Expanded Public Service Loan Forgiveness (TEPSLF) Program to allow student debtors to
bypass certain requirements of the PSLF. 65
IBR (2007) offered all borrowers the opportunity to limit their monthly payments to
fifteen percent of their discretionary income and to receive loan forgiveness after twenty-five
years of regular payments.66 In 2010, Congress revised IBR (IBR (2010)) to permit new
borrowers after July 1, 2014 to limit payments to ten percent of discretionary income (as opposed

60

See id. sec. 203, § 493C(b).

61

Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 30.

62

See College Cost Reduction and Access Act sec. 401, § 455(m)(1) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087e(m)(1)).
63

Alan White, The Contract State, Program Failure, and Congressional Intent: The Case of the Public
Service
Loan Forgiveness Program, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 255, 264 (2020).
See id. at 263–64 (citing FED. STUDENT AID OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., JUNE 2019 PSLF REPORT:
PUBLIC
SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS (PSLF) PROGRAM DATA ¶¶ 8, 16 (2019), https://studentaid.gov/datacenter/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data).
65
See id. (citing Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 315, 132 Stat. 348 (2018)).
64

66

See College Cost Reduction and Access Act sec. 203, § 493C (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §
1098e(e)).
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to fifteen percent under IBR (2007)) and to receive forgiveness after twenty years (as opposed to
twenty-five years under IBR (2007)). 67
In 2012, the Obama administration built on the statutory remedies of the PSLF and IBR
(2010) programs through administrative action.68 Relying on the 1993 amendments to the HEA
that established ICR, the Obama administration created the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) plan,
which extended the IBR (2010) payment terms to loans borrowed after October 1, 2011. 69 PAYE
also limited the effect of interest accrual on loans subject to an income-based repayment plan. 70
The Obama administration followed up on PAYE in 2015 with the Revised Pay As You
Earn (REPAYE) payment plan. 71 REPAYE permitted all borrowers, regardless of loan date, to
choose to devote ten percent of their discretionary income to student loan debt—including, for
the first time among federal student loan repayment plans, borrowers for whom ten percent of
their income was greater than the standard repayment.72 REPAYE thus permitted high income
borrowers to pay off their loans faster, avoiding interest that would otherwise accrue over the life

67

See SAFRA Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, sec. 2213, § 493C 124 Stat. 1029, 1074–81 (2010) (enacted as
part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. 1098e(e)); see
also Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 31.
68

Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 32.

69

See id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(iii)(B) (2019) (time period for applicable loans); id. §
685.209(a)(2)(i)
(repayment terms)).
70

See id. at 31–32 (explaining that loans in income-based repayment plans would accrue interest, which
would be capitalized into the loan balance, leading to compounding of interest on a larger principal, a
phenomenon known as “negative amortization”).
71

See Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D.
Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,204 (Oct. 30, 2015); see also Brooks & Levitin,
supra note 35, at 32.
72
See Brooks & Levitin, supra note 35, at 32–33.
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of the loan.73 REPAYE also went even further than PAYE in limiting the effect of interest
accrual.74
The most recent federal actions to forgive student loans have been emergency measures
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.75 The Department of Education took certain of these
measures under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES
Act),76 which authorizes the Department to waive or modify statutory and regulatory
requirements governing the HEA student loan programs in connection with a national emergency
as declared by the President. 77 After President Trump declared a national emergency in
connection with the COVID-19 pandemic on March 13, 2020, Secretary of Education Betsy
DeVos, acting pursuant to the HEROES Act, “set all federal student loan interest rates to zero
and automatically enter[ed] borrowers into administrative forbearance, allowing them to defer
payments without financial penalty.”78 By placing federal student loans in forbearance, with an
interest rate of 0%, while continuing to permit debtors to make repayments, the Department of

73

See id. at 33.

74

See id. at 32.

75

See ALEXANDRA HEGJI, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46314, FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN DEBT RELIEF IN THE
CONTEXT OF COVID-19, at 8–12 (2020) (discussing limited Department of Education administrative
student loan relief in response to COVID-19 national emergency).
76

20 U.S.C. §§ 1098aa–1098ee (authorizing student loan relief in connection with national emergencies).

77

See HEGJI, supra note 75, at 14–16 (discussing applicability of HEROES Act to student loan relief in
context of COVID-19 national emergency).
78
Secretary DeVos Extends Student Loan Forbearance Period Through January 31, 2021, in Response to
COVID-19 National Emergency, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-devos-extends-student-loan-forbearance-period-through-january-31-2021-responsecovid-19-national-emergency.
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Education enabled debtors to pay less than they otherwise would over the lifetime of their
loans.79
III.

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FORGIVENESS OF
STUDENT LOANS
This part considers the legal basis for administrative forgiveness of student loans. Section

A examines the primary statutory authorities that the Department of Education might rely on to
forgive student loans. Section B considers whether the Department’s student loan forgiveness
decisions would represent exercises of nonenforcement discretion and be unreviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA); Section B also considers whether the Department ought to
engage in notice and comment rulemaking in connection with widespread student loan
forgiveness.80 Section C analyzes the alternative argument that the HEROES Act permits
widespread student loan forgiveness during the exigency of a national emergency like the
COVID-19 pandemic. Section D discusses recent legislation permitting the Treasury to exclude
forgiven student loans from taxable gross income and also considers whether Treasury could
have extended favorable tax treatment to student loan forgiveness absent a legislative fix.

79

See id.; Kelly Anne Smith, (COVID-19) Federal Student Loan Forbearance Calculator: How Will You
Be Affected?, FORBES ADVISOR (Aug. 13, 2020, 12:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/studentloans/federal-student-loan-coronavirus-forbearance-covid19-calculator/ (“If you continue to make
[federal student loan] payments at this time, you’ll be paying down your principal faster, since interest
won’t accrue. That means you’ll make a bigger dent in your balance.”).
80

5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2) (foreclosing review of agency actions “committed to agency discretion by law”).
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A. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FORGIVENESS
OF STUDENT LOANS
The executive branch may not forgive debts owed to the federal government without a
statutory grant of that power from Congress.81 The Property Clause of the Constitution 82 grants
Congress alone the “[p]ower to release or otherwise dispose of the rights and property of the
United States.”83 Moreover, under the Appropriations Clause, 84 “no money can be paid out of the
Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.”85 These constitutional
provisions forbid “erroneously or illegally made” expenditures of federal funds or dispositions of
federal property.86 The Federal Circuit recently reiterated these principles, holding that
overpayments to federal contractors violate the Property and Appropriations Clauses and,
therefore, entitle the government to recover.87 In addition to these constitutional principles, the
Antideficiency Act imposes criminal liability on executive branch employees who spend
unappropriated funds.88

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFF. OF GENERAL COUNSEL, 3 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14–17 (3d. 2008).
81

82

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

83

Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 294–95 (1941) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2.); see also Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 268, 271 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (“[W]hen
a payment is erroneously or illegally made it is in direct violation of article IV, section 3, clause 2, of the
Constitution.” (citing Royal Indemnity, 313 U.S. at 294)).
84

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.

85

Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937).

86

Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C.P. v. United States, 969 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

87

Id. at 1365–66.

31 U.S.C. § 1341(a); id. § 1350 (authorizing criminal fines and up to two years’ imprisonment for
violations of Antideficiency Act); see Herrine, supra note 16, at 399–400; Matthew B. Lawrence,
Disappropriation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 83 (2020). But see Kenneth J. Allen, The Obsolete Services
88
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The Property Clause, Appropriations Clause, and Antideficiency Act prohibit executive
agencies from forgiving debts to the United States or waiving recovery of such debts without “a
clear statutory basis.”89 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”)’s efforts to
recoup overpayments of disaster relief to victims of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita
exemplify the exacting bite of this principle: even though FEMA made the payments with the
encouragement of government agents who misunderstood the scope of their power,90 and
notwithstanding strong equities favoring the misled victims, FEMA reasoned that “it [did] not
have authority to dismiss debts to the U.S. government, even those of small or ‘de minimis’
amounts,” and accordingly concluded that any overpayments were “subject to recoupment.” 91
As a consequence of these background constitutional and statutory rules, executive
agencies usually cannot forgive performing debts. 92 The primary statute governing when
agencies may forgive debts, the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966 (FCCA), as amended by
the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (DCIA),93 does not provide for forgiveness of

Restrictions of the Antideficiency Act—Still The Law, BRIEFING PAPERS, Nov. 2017, at 1 n.6, 17-12
Briefing Papers 1 (“[T]here are no reported prosecutions for violations of any of the ADA provisions [as
of November 2017].”).
89
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE , supra note 81, at 14-75; see 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a); see also 31
U.S.C. § 1301(a) (“Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were
made except as otherwise provided by law.”).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-12-62, FEMA’S EFFORTS TO
RECOUP IMPROPER PAYMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DISASTER ASSISTANCE RECOUPMENT
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2011, at 2 (2012).
90

91

Id. Congress ultimately awarded FEMA limited authority to waive these debts in 2011. See
Consolidated Appropriations Ac, Pub. L. No.112-74, § 565(b)(2), 125 Stat. 786, 982 (2011); see also
Healy, supra note 28, at 7–8 (discussing this statute).
92

See BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., TREATISE ON FEDERAL NONTAX DEBT COLLECTION I:3 (2019).

93

31 U.S.C. §§ 3701–02, 3711–3720E.
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performing loans.94 While the FCCA grants agencies the power to “compromise” debt claims
under enumerated circumstances, it also commands agencies to “try to collect” on such claims.95
The Federal Claims Collection Standards (FCCS),96 regulations implementing the FCCA, require
agencies to “aggressively” collect debts, and permit concessions on debt only where: (1) the
debtor is unable to pay; (2) the agency is unable to collect; (3) the costs of collection are too
onerous; or (4) the government faces litigation risk. 97 As a result, the FCCA grants agencies only
a constrained authority to forgive debts.98
However, the FCCA and FCCS do not apply to debt collection activities expressly
governed by other statutes,99 and the HEA independently grants the Department of Education
authority to “modif[y]”100 and to “compromise, waive, or release” 101 FFELP and Perkins
loans.102 These powers have been described respectively as “modification” and “settlement”

94

See id. § 3711(a)(1); Healy, supra note 28, at 7.

95
96

31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1)–(2).
31 C.F.R. Subt. B, Ch. IX.

97

Id. §§ 901.1, 902.2(a).

98

See 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1)–(2).

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 14-76; Federal Claims Collection Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-508, § 4, 80 Stat. 308, 309 (July 19, 1966) (“Nothing in this Act shall increase or diminish
the existing authority of the head of an agency to litigate claims, or diminish his existing authority to
settle, compromise, or close claims.”); 31 C.F.R. § 900.4. The FCCS, as regulations, likely do not
permanently preclude administrative forgiveness of student loans even if they apply. See Herrine, supra
note 16, at 386.
99

100

20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(4) (FFELP); id. § 1087hh(1) (Perkins).

101

Id. § 1082(a)(6) (FFELP); id. § 1087hh(2) (Perkins).

But see Salazar v. King, 822 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1)), “The Secretary
[of Education], as the head of the [Department of Education], is required to try to collect federally
guaranteed student loan debt.”).
102

113

authority.103 Proponents of administrative forgiveness of student loans argue that the HEA
provides a “clear statutory basis”104 for the Department of Education’s plenary authority to
forgive student loans in whole or in part, including in circumstances where agencies bound by
the FCCA and FCCS would be unable to forgive debt.105
As a preliminary matter, even if the HEA grants plenary authority to the Department of
Education to forgive FFELP and Perkins loans, it remains possible that the HEA does not
provide the Department with the same authority over Direct loans, as the HEA does not
explicitly grant modification and settlement authority over Direct loans. 106 The statutory basis for
applying both modification and settlement provisions of the HEA to Direct loans is a provision
that requires parity between the terms of FFELP and Direct loans.107 That statutory hook may not
be enough for the HEA, and not the FCCA, to govern collection of Direct loans.108 In its January
2021 opinion letter, the Department of Education’s OGC opined that “because [the Department

Herrine, supra note 16, at 370. Equivalently, other sources refer to this “settlement” authority as the
Department of Education’s “compromise” authority. See, e.g., Letter to Senator Warren, supra note 26, at
3.
103

104

U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 81, at 14-75.
See Herrine, supra note 16, at 379–80 & n.290. This paper will use the term “constrained” forgiveness
authority to describe modification or settlement authority insufficient to permit widespread student loan
forgiveness, and the term “plenary” forgiveness authority to describe authority adequate for such
forgiveness. Compare Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 1 (arguing that Department of
Education has only constrained forgiveness authority), with Letter to Senator Warren, supra note 26, at 1–
2 (arguing that Department of Education has plenary forgiveness authority under the HEA).
105

106

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 370–71 & nn. 262–65.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1) (“Unless otherwise specified in this part, [Direct] loans . . . shall have the
same terms, conditions, and benefits, and be available in the same amounts, as loans made to borrowers
[of FFELP loans]”).
107

108

See Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508, § 4, 80 Stat. 308 (1966). The FCCA
yields only to “existing” agency head authority, so the FCCA would apply unless the HEA grants the
Department of Education “existing” authority over Direct loan debts. See id.
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of Education’s] general power to compromise or waive claims under [FFELP] is neither a term
nor a condition nor a benefit of [FFELP] loans,”109 it is “debatable” that the Department of
Education has the same settlement authority with respect to both FFELP and Direct loans. 110 If
the FCCA governs collection of Direct loans, the Department of Education must “try to collect”
on these loans and likely could not forgive performing loans.111
Assuming that the Department of Education’s modification and settlement authorities are
the same with respect to Perkins, FFELP, and Direct loans, then whether the Department of
Education has plenary authority under the HEA to forgive student loans is a matter of statutory
interpretation. The Department of Education’s interpretations of the HEA may face the crucible
of judicial review, requiring the Department to defend its view that the HEA permits widespread
student loan forgiveness.112
On its face, the provision establishing the Department of Education’s settlement authority
appears to be consistent with plenary authority for loan forgiveness. 113 The HEA grants the
Department of Education authority “to enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release any right,
title, claim, lien, or demand, however acquired, including any equity or right of redemption.”114
Read literally, this language appears to grant the Department of Education the power to forgive
student loans at will—the January 2021 Department of Education letter acknowledged that

109

Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 4. n.3.

110
111

See id.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3711 (a)(1); see Healy, supra note 28, at 7.

112

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 367.

See Hunt, supra note 26, at 39 (“[U]nder a textualist approach to statutory interpretation,
relinquishment authority should be interpreted to cover a federal student loan jubilee . . . .”).
113

114

20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) (emphasis added) (FFELP); id. § 1087hh(2) (emphasis added) (Perkins).

115

interpretation as the “hyperliteral” reading. 115 In addition, the Department of Education’s
settlement authority under the HEA, which includes the power to “waive” and “release” claims,
is arguably broader than the FCCA’s “compromise” authority.116
Independently, the Department of Education’s modification authority appears to
encompass forgiving loan balances and may also be read as a grant of plenary forgiveness
authority.117 The HEA grants the Department of Education authority “to consent to modification,
with respect to rate of interest, time of payment of any installment of principal and interest or any
portion thereof, or any other provision of any [student loan].”118 As a factual matter, the
Department of Education has used this modification authority to eliminate individual loan
balances (at least with respect to non-performing loans).119
Authorities are mixed on whether statutory language authorizing “modification” could
grant plenary authority to dramatically change a federal program. On one hand, the Department
of Education letter, relying on MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,120

See Department of Education Letter, supra note 27 (“[R]eading 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) to permit the
Secretary, on a blanket or mass basis, to . . .forgive student loan principal balances . . . would ‘be
hyperliteral and contrary to common sense.’”) (quoting RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated
Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012)).
115

116
117

Compare 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(6), 1087hh(2), with 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(2).
See infra notes 118–130.

118

20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(4) (emphasis added) (FFELP); id. § 1087hh(1) (emphasis added) (Perkins).

119

See Letter to Senator Warren, supra note 26, at 5 n.21; Carr et al. v. DeVos, Case No. 19-cv-6597
(S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 15-1 ¶ 8(j) (Decl. of Cristin Bulman) (“Plaintiff Carr defaulted on [Direct loan]
obligations . . . . Plaintiff Carr’s loans were modified . . . pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(4), resulting in
balances of $0.00 and thus no money owed by Plaintiff Carr.”).
120

512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994).

116

argued that “modify” means “to change moderately or in minor fashion.”121 On the other hand, in
the technical context of federal budgeting for a loan or loan guarantee program, an Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) circular defines a modification as a “[g]overnment action that
(1) differs from actions assumed in the baseline estimate of cash flows and (2) changes the
estimated cost of an outstanding direct loan . . . or loan guarantee.”122 Per the OMB circular,
modifications “may be any size” and may be the product of actions including loan
“forgiveness.”123 Moreover, because modifications deviate from budget assumptions, the OMB
circular’s modification definition excludes “routine administrative work-outs . . . of troubled
loans or loans in imminent default,”124 such as “forgiving [loan] principal or interest.”125 Thus,
the relevant HEA language plausibly authorizes more than just “routine” Department loan
forgiveness.126 In addition, the HEA’s grant of modification authority arguably has no equivalent
in the FCCA, which addresses only settlement authority.127 Thus, where the FCCA limits the
Department’s settlement authority, the Department could plausibly rely on HEA modification
authority without contradiction.128 Notably, the January 2021 Department of Education Letter

See Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 6 (discussing the Department of Education’s
modification authority under the HEROES Act).
121

122

OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11,
PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET § 185.3(s), (z) (2020).
123
Id.
124

Id. § 185.3(z).

125

Id. § 185.3(ac) (defining “work-out”).

126

See id. § 185.3(z), (ac).

127

See Letter to Senator Warren, supra note 26, at 6.

128

See id.
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does discuss HEA modification authority. 129 However, this exclusion may signal that OGC
considers the provision establishing settlement authority a significantly stronger statutory basis
for plenary forgiveness authority than the modification provision.130
During the two decades preceding the HEA, these modification and settlement provisions
appeared in several statutes relating to loans under the discretion of administrative agencies.131
The HEA’s formulations of modification and settlement authority likely originated in a 1945
draft of amendments to the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill). 132 In a hearing on
amending the GI Bill, Maurice Collins, who oversaw the GI Bill’s loan guarantee program,
proposed amending the GI Bill to expand the authority of the Administrator of Veteran’s Affairs
with respect to GI Bill loan guarantees. 133 Assistant Administrator Collins proposed granting the
Administrator the power to “consent to the modification with respect to rate of interest, time of

See Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 3–4 (addressing the Department of Education’s
settlement authority under 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) but not the Department of Education’s modification
authority under § 1082(a)(4)).
129

Cf. id. at 6 (dismissing argument that HEROES Act “modification” authority could encompass plenary
authority to forgive student loans).
130

E.g. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub L. No. 268, § 509(a)(2), (4), 59 Stat. 631 ((permitting “the
Administrator [of Veterans Affairs to] . . . (2) consent to the modification, with respect to rate of interest,
time of payment of principal or interest or any portion thereof, security or other provisions of any . . . loan
which has been guaranteed or insured [through this program] . . . [and] (4) pay, compromise, waive or
release any right, title claim, lien or demand, however acquired, including any equity or any right of
redemption . . . .”); Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 1820(a)(2), (4), 72 Stat. 1213 (same); see
also National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub L. No. 85-864, § 209(a), 72 Stat. 1587 (“The
Commissioner [of Education] . . . shall have power to agree to modifications of agreements or loans . . .
and to compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim, or demand, however arising or acquired under
this title.”).
131

See Amendments to the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944: Hearing on H.R. 3749 Before the
Subcomm. on Veterans’ Legis. of the S. Comm. on Fin., 79th Cong. 79–83 (1945) (statement of Maurice
Collins, Director, Financial Service, Veterans’ Administration, Accompanied by Edward E. Odom,
Solicitor, and Francis X. Pavesich, Chief, Loan Guaranty Division, Veterans’ Administration).
132

133

See id. at 65.
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payment of principal, or interest, or any portion thereof, security or other provisions of any note,
contract, mortgage, or any lien instrument with respect to [GI Bill loan guarantees]” and to “pay,
compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim, lien, or demand, however acquired,
including any equity or any right of redemption.”134 Assistant Administrator Collins argued that
these changes would grant the Administrator “proper discretionary power to deal in the various
complications which will arise in the course of the guaranty program.”135 He further explained
that “Congress is the only authority that can actually dispose of Government property,” and
while Congress had placed “certain authority to [dispose of Government property] in different
administrative officials,” the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs had authority only “to dispose of
surplus property.”136 Discretion over a loan guarantee program would require additional power—
“this would hardly be surplus property.”137 The Senate version of the 1945 GI Amendments
granted the requested modification and settlement authorities essentially unchanged; the Senate
Report explained: “The powers at present vested in the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs are
inadequate to enable him to perform the functions required of him under the present act. This
new section is added in order to enable him efficiently to conduct those functions.” 138 The 1945
amendments to the GI Bill ultimately incorporated these grants of modification and settlement
authority.139

134

Id. at 80.

135
136

Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 81.

137

Id.

138

S. Rep. No. 698 at 6 (1945).

See Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub L. No. 268, § 509(a)(2), (4), 59 Stat. 631 ((“[T]he Administrator [of
Veterans Affairs] may . . . (2) consent to the modification, with respect to rate of interest, time of payment
139
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On September 2, 1958, Congress passed additional veterans’ legislation repeating these
grants of modification and settlement authority to the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs and
also passed the NDEA, which contained a nearly identical grant of settlement authority and a
grant of authority to “agree to modifications of agreements or loans.”140
Throughout the HEA’s legislative history, the adoption of particular language for the
Secretary’s modification and settlement authority received little attention,141 perhaps because
those particular formulations of administrative modification and settlement authority were
already entrenched as a consequence of their adoption in the 1945 GI Bill Amendments. A
House Report on a draft of the HEA stated merely that the section on settlement and
modification “authorizes the Commissioner [of Education], in carrying out the act, to make
regulations, sue and be sued, prescribe and modify the terms of insurance contracts, permit the
modification of student loan agreements, and to settle insurance claims.” 142
On the other hand, the language added to the HEA in 1965 must be contextualized within
the era’s legal structure of government debt collection, under which federal agencies had

of principal or interest or any portion thereof, security or other provisions of any . . . loan which has been
guaranteed or insured [through this program] . . . [and] (4) pay, compromise, waive or release any right,
title claim, lien or demand, however acquired, including any equity or any right of redemption . . . .”).
Compare Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 1820(a)(2), (4), 72 Stat. 1213 ((“[T]he
Administrator [of Veterans Affairs] may . . . (2) consent to the modification, with respect to rate of
interest, time of payment of principal or interest or any portion thereof, security or other provisions of any
. . . loan which has been guaranteed or insured [through this program] . . . [and] (4) pay, compromise,
waive or release any right, title claim, lien or demand, however acquired, including any equity or any
right of redemption . . . .”), with National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub L. No. 85-864, § 209(a),
72 Stat. 1587 (“The Commissioner [of Education] . . . shall have power to agree to modifications of
agreements or loans . . . and to compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim, or demand, however
arising or acquired under this title.”).
141
See Herrine, supra note 16, at 377 n.283 (observing that neither the legislative history of the NDEA
nor that of the HEA explains the scope of the Department of Education’s settlement authority).
140

H. Rep. No. 621 at 49 (1965). The report’s only further comment on the provision was that “[t]he
Commissioner’s financial operations are subject to the Government Corporation Control Act.” Id.
142
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extremely limited authority to compromise on otherwise collectable debts. The original version
of the GAO’s Principles of Federal Appropriations Law describes this context in an overview of
the FCCA:
Prior to 1966, there were no uniform policies or procedures for debt
collection throughout the Government. While GAO made some efforts by virtue
of its audit and claims settlement functions, debt collection lacked a Governmentwide statutory basis and procedures varied greatly from agency to agency. Lack
of adequate statutory powers also hampered debt collection. For example, GAO
had long construed the authority to “settle and adjust” claims as not including the
authority to compromise . . . . Although a few agencies had specific compromise
authority, most, GAO included, did not. To make things worse, to simply
terminate collection action would have been viewed as giving away Government
property, which no Government official has the right to do.
Thus, the administrative agency had to attempt to collect the full amount
of the debt. If the agency was unsuccessful, it had to refer the claim to GAO,
which again could do nothing more than to attempt to collect the full amount. If
GAO’s efforts were similarly fruitless, the claim went to the Justice Department,
and it was only there that compromise could be considered. Under this system, the
Justice Department was burdened with referrals of worthless as well as collectible
debts. Congress was also burdened with many requests for private relief
legislation.
In 1966, Congress took the first major step toward establishing a
Government-wide system of debt collection. This, of course, was the enactment of
the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966.143
While not an authoritative interpretation of the HEA, this excerpt explains the contemporaneous
understanding of the purpose of agency compromise authority (whatever its statutory source):
allowing agencies to compromise without involving the Department of Justice or Congress.144
Additionally, the GAO unambiguously states that no government official, even one with

143

See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 11167 (1st ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
144

See id.
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compromise authority, had authority to “simply terminate collection action”—implying that the
Department had not received plenary compromise authority in the 1965 HEA.145
In sum, the plain text of the HEA’s grants of modification and settlement authority, read
in isolation, could literally be read as compatible with widespread student loan forgiveness.146
The legislative history of these particular provisions suggests that Congress uses this language
when it wishes to grant discretion to an administrative agency to dispose of the property of the
United States, but the scope of that discretion is not well defined.147 At minimum, the legislative
history of the provisions themselves does not foreclose a broad reading of the Department of
Education’s discretion to forgive performing loans.148 On the other hand, contemporaneous
understandings of compromise authority, of the sort expressed in the GAO excerpt quoted above,
bear on the appropriate interpretation of the Department of Education’s forgiveness authority.149
The plain text and legislative history of the HEA’s grants of modification and settlement
authority notwithstanding, other portions of the HEA may be read to narrow these grants.150
Certain provisions of the HEA establish specific cases for when the Department of Education
may or must exercise its modification and settlement powers and contour the extent of those
powers in those cases.151 These provisions may be understood as “specific” provisions that
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See id.
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See supra, text at notes 113–30.
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See supra, text at notes 131–42.

148

See id.
See supra, text at notes 143–45.
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See Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 3–4 (arguing that 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) is a
“general” provision and that other “specific” provisions govern).
151

See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(f) (authorizing deferment from paying periodic installments of principal
need for certain borrowers during their studies and for borrowers receiving cancer treatment); id. §

122

“govern[]” the “general”152 grants of modification and settlement authority. 153 Furthermore,
because Congress enacted narrow grants of authority for limited student loan forgiveness through
the HEROES ACT, PSLF, ICR, IBR (2007), IBR (2010), and TEPSLF, Congress has arguably
signaled through statutory history that the Department of Education lacked the authority to
implement those programs under the unamended HEA.154
In addition, the role of the modification and settlement provisions within the broader
HEA suggests that they provide constrained, not plenary, compromise authority. Congress
established express modification and settlement authority solely for Perkins and FFELP, the two
programs where creditors other than the Department hold most of the debt.155 When Congress
created FFELP loan forgiveness programs, rather than directing the Department to cancel student
loans, it instead directed the Department to assume responsibility for repaying those loans—a
solution that reflected that debtors typically owed their student loans to creditors other than the
Department.156 Meanwhile, Congress repeatedly directed (or permitted) the Department to

1087e(h) (directing the Department to specify acts or omissions by institutions of higher education that
are permissible defenses to loan repayment); HEROES Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1098aa–1098ee (authorizing
student loan accommodations during national emergencies); see also Department of Education Letter,
supra note 27, at 3 (invoking certain of these provisions).
152

See Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 3 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)).
See id. (“Title IV [of the HEA]’s plain text and statutory scheme, and controlling interpretative canons,
compel us to conclude Congress appropriated funds for student loans with the expectation that such loans
would be repaid except in very specific circumstances.”).
153

See, e.g., Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we
presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”).
155
See Herrine, supra note 16, at 395 (recognizing that “DOE can only decline to enforce debts it has the
ability to enforce” and noting that “DOE does not have direct claims on most FFELP or any Perkins
debtors”).
154

See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-11(a)(2)(A) (“Method of loan forgiveness[:] To provide loan forgiveness . . . the
Secretary is authorized to carry out a program . . . through the holder of the loan, to assume the obligation
156
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forgive Direct loans—all of which the Department holds—through cancellation.157 These
discrepancies suggest Congress crafted the modification and settlement authorities for programs
where Congress did not envision the Department as the chief creditor making the ultimate
decision whether to collect.158
Moreover, a court may deny deference to the Department’s interpreting the HEA’s grant
of settlement authority to imply Congress appropriated the entire balance of the student loan
portfolio for possible loan forgiveness.159 Under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990
(FCRA),160 Congress must annually appropriate the “costs” of most new or “modified” federal
loans.161 However, FFELP and the Direct program are entitlements exempt from the annual

to repay a qualified loan amount for a [FFELP] loan . . . .”); id. § 1078-12(c) (“[T]he Secretary shall carry
out a program of assuming the obligation to repay a [FFELP, Direct, or Perkins] student loan, by direct
payments on behalf of a borrower to the holder of such loan). But see id. § 1098e(b) (directing the
Department of Education, in connection with income-based repayment plans, to “repay or cancel any
outstanding balance of principal and interest due on all [FFELP or Direct] loans”). While § 1098e(b)
authorizes both forgiveness through repayment and forgiveness through cancellation, it likely is best read
with the understanding that the Department of Education would forgive FFELP loans owed to third
parties through repayment.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-11(a)(2)(B) (“Method of loan forgiveness[:] To provide loan forgiveness . . . the
Secretary is authorized to carry out a program . . . to cancel a qualified loan amount for a [Direct] loan . . .
.”); id. § 1087e(m)(1)) (directing the Department of Education, in connection with income-based
repayment plans, to “cancel the balance of interest and principal due, in accordance with paragraph (2),
on any eligible Federal Direct Loan not in default”); 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e) (directing the Department of
Education, in connection with income-based repayment plans, to repay or cancel any outstanding balance
of principal and interest due on all [FFELP or Direct] loans”); but see id. § 1078-12(c) (“[T]he Secretary
shall carry out a program of assuming the obligation to repay a [FFELP, Direct, or Perkins] student loan,
by direct payments on behalf of a borrower to the holder of such loan).
157

158
159

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 395.
See Healy, supra note 28, at 34–37 (discussing Congressional appropriations for FFELP and Direct).
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2 U.S.C. § 661c.

161

Id. § 661c(b), (e).
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appropriations process.162 The FCRA requires the government to budget for federal loans under
accrual accounting using an annual estimate of the loans’ net present value.163 Thus, under
FCRA, forgiving a student loan is tantamount to an expenditure of the value of that loan, 164 yet
this expenditure requires no new appropriation. 165
Reading the HEA alongside the FCRA, courts may conclude that it would be “contrary to
clear congressional intent” to hold that the Department can spend $1.5663 trillion without a new

See 20 U.S.C. 1087a(a) (“There are hereby made available, in accordance with the provisions of this
part, such sums as may be necessary . . . to make [Direct] loans . . . [and to] purchas[e] [Direct] loans
under . . . this title.”); Federal Credit Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 661c(c) (designating the “guaranteed student
loan program” an entitlement exempt from appropriations); Healy, supra note 28, at 39.
162

163

See NEILL PERRY & PUJA SEAMS, ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING FOR FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS: THE
FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990, at 4–6 (Apr. 20, 2005).
164

See id. (detailing calculation of “subsidy cost” of loans on federal balance sheet).

165

2 U.S.C. § 661c(c). In addition, a recent Trump administration executive order requires that any
“discretionary administrative action” that “increase[s] mandatory spending,” such as spending on an
entitlement, be offset with reductions elsewhere, unless OMB says otherwise. Exec. Order No. 13,893, 84
Fed. Reg. 55,487 (Oct. 16, 2019); see Herrine, supra note 16, at 401. This executive order
institutionalized an OMB policy known as Administrative Pay-As-You-Go (Administrative PAYGO),
which OMB introduced in 2005. See President Trump Bolsters Administrative PAYGO Through
Executive Order, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Oct. 16, 2019),
http://www.crfb.org/blogs/president-trump-bolsters-administrative-paygo-through-executive-order. In
contrast to Statutory PAYGO, the legislative equivalent, Administrative PAYGO has no enforcement
mechanism that automatically enacts offsetting spending cuts. Id. The Biden administration will need to
navigate around this policy, either by changing it or by obtaining the applicable OMB waiver. See
Herrine, supra note 16, at 402.
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appropriation.166 Federal courts have resisted deferring to agencies when agencies infer
appropriations from ambiguous statutory text.167
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, the federal district court for the District of
Columbia refused to grant Chevron deference to agency interpretations of provisions of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that inferred a permanent appropriation for
reimbursements to health insurers.168 The court emphasized that “[a] law may be construed to
make an appropriation out of the Treasury . . . only if the law specifically states that an
appropriation is made,”169 and stressed that “[t]his principle is even more important in the case of
a permanent appropriation.”170
Comprehensive administrative forgiveness of $1.5663 trillion may also be such a “major
national policy decision[]” that, per the Non-Delegation Doctrine, it “must be made by Congress

166

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); see Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“[Congress] does not . . . hide elephants in
mouseholes.”); see also Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 4 (“Attempting to shoehorn
broad authority into 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) would create a paradigmatic “elephant in a mousehole,”
swallow up and render surplusage many [HEA] Title IV provisions, and needlessly create Spending
Clause, Antideficiency Act, and dispensing power concerns.” (quoting Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468)). The
January 2021 Department of Education Letter further argued that the executive branch is constrained by
the Constitution’s Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[the President] shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”) not to use settlement authority as a dispensing power. Department of
Education Letter, supra, at 4.
167

See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016).

168

See id.

169

Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d)).

170

Id. (quoting Remission to Guam & Virgin Islands of Estimates of Moneys to be Collected, B-114808,
1979 WL 12213, at *3 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 7, 1979)).
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and the President in the legislative process, not delegated by Congress to the Executive.”171
Courts may be inclined to read the HEA narrowly to avoid this issue.172
Meanwhile, unlike FFELP and the Direct program, Perkins is not an entitlement. 173
Currently, Perkins loans debtors are not in debt to the federal government.174 Were that to change
to facilitate Perkins loans’ administrative forgiveness,175 such forgiveness would be subject to
the FCRA.176 Forgiveness of Perkins loans would still be possible without Congressional
appropriations to the extent that the forgiveness constitutes a “reestimate” for which the FCRA
provides “permanent indefinite authority” rather than a “modification” which requires an
appropriation.177 A “reestimate” is a “revision[]” of the “cost estimate” of a class of loans; a

171

Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
142 S. Ct. 661, 665-66 (2022) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (enjoining Occupational
Safety and Health Administration workplace vaccination mandate as in excess of statutory authority
under the major questions doctrine because“[w]e expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an
agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance” and “lack of historical precedent,
coupled with the breadth of authority that the Secretary now claims, is a telling indication that the
mandate extends beyond the agency’s legitimate reach”).
See, e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”).
172

173

See 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa(b) (2012) (amended 2015) (authorizing annual appropriations for Perkins
program); 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa(b) (prohibiting future appropriations for Perkins program); Letter to
Senator Warren, supra note 26, at 2.
174

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 395 (noting that all Perkins loans and some eighty-five percent of
outstanding FFELP loans are not owed to the federal government).
175

Proponents of administrative forgiveness of student loans have proposed options for the Department of
Education to take possession of loans owed to third-parties. See id. However, all of these approaches
require actions by autonomous third-parties. See id. at 396 (suggesting the Department of Education could
obtain possession over FFELP loans through negotiations with guaranty agencies or if FFELP buyers
universally defaulted); id. at 396–97 (suggesting the Department of Education could obtain possession
over Perkins loans through negotiations with higher education institutions). As a result, loans not owed to
the federal government would be particularly difficult to forgive administratively. See id.
176

See 2 U.S.C. § 661c.

177

2 U.S.C. § 661c(e)–(f); see PERRY & SEAMS, supra note 163, at 11.
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“modification” is “a Government action” that “differs from actions assumed in the baseline
estimate” and “changes the estimated cost of an outstanding . . . loan.”178 Though limited relief to
Perkins loan debtors may plausibly be a reestimate, comprehensive relief for these borrowers is
likely a modification impossible without Congressional approval.179
B. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS TO FORGIVE STUDENT LOANS
Assuming the Department of Education has the appropriate statutory authority to dispose
of student loans, the Department has several means of achieving administrative student loan
forgiveness. Some, but not all, of the Department’s options include notice and comment
rulemaking.180
Proponents of administrative student debt forgiveness argue that the Department of
Education’s decision to forgive student loans would be strictly discretionary, require no further
rulemaking, and be immune from judicial review.181 On this view, loan modification or
settlement is an exercise of the Department of Education’s enforcement discretion because it
represents “a decision not to enforce” the Department’s HEA rights.182 Agencies’ decisions not
to enforce statutes are often unreviewable under the APA because they are “committed to agency

178

OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 122, § 185.3(s), (z).

179

See id.; PERRY & SEAMS, supra note 163, at 11.

See Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 8 (“Even if the HEA could be fairly construed
as granting the Secretary authority to provide blanket or mass . . . forgiveness of student loan[s] . . .
Executive action doing so might be appropriately and necessarily considered a legislative rule under the
[APA]. As such, all the requirements of notice and comment rulemaking . . . might need to be met.”)
180

181

Herrine, supra note 16, at 368.

182

Id.; see also Healy, supra note 28, at 17–19.
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discretion by law.”183 Consequently, proponents argue that the Department of Education has
discretion to forgive student loans—i.e., to decide not to enforce the HEA—and that the
Department of Education’s exercise of that discretion would be unreviewable under the APA. 184
The Supreme Court in Chaney articulated the standard for when agencies’
nonenforcement decisions are immune to APA review.185 Under Chaney, a court may not review
nonenforcement decisions unless the court has “law to apply” of sufficient specificity to be a
“meaningful standard against which to judge” the “agency’s exercise of discretion.” 186 But
agencies’ decisions to waive debts may be reviewable if “the substantive statute has provided
guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers” and nonenforcement
would “disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency administers.” 187 In
Sioux Honey, the Federal Circuit applied these principles from Chaney to an agency’s decision to
write down debt as uncollectable.188 The court held that the write-down was unreviewable, but
implied it might have been reviewable if law prohibited it.189
Chaney and Sioux Honey suggest that the Department’s decision to forgive student loans
could be reviewable if the HEA or FCCA provides “legislative direction” against forgiving

183

5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2); see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830–31 (1985) (holding Food and Drug
Administration’s decision not to enforce statute in particular instance was unreviewable under the APA
because nonenforcement decisions are committed to agency discretion by law).
184
Herrine, supra note 16, at 368.
185

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830.

186

Id.

See Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 1041, 1060–61 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832–33).
187

188

See id. at 1061 (citing Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831).

189

See id. (citing Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831).
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performing student loans.190 Notably, “an agency’s statutory interpretations made in the course
of nonenforcement decisions are reviewable,” meaning courts may at least interpret the HEA and
FCCA.191 And agency statutory interpretations justifying nonenforcement enjoy less judicial
deference than those with the benefit of notice and comment rulemaking. 192 In considering the
Department’s nonenforcement against student debtors, a court may conclude that neither the
HEA nor FCCA authorize the Department of Education to forgive more than one trillion dollars
in performing loans.193
Here, a court might find “law to apply” and review nonenforcement-based student loan
forgiveness—specifically, law forbidding the Department from forgiving performing loans.194
The Department does not have modification and settlement authorities over FFELP and Perkins
loans until it takes possession of these loans from private lenders, 195 and it does not typically take
possession of performing FFELP and Perkins loans. 196 As Direct loans carry the same terms as

190

See id. at 1060 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832–33).
Montana Air Chapter No. 29, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations, Auth., 898
F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1990).
191

192

See JAMES T. O’REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 18:12 (2020 ed. 2020).

193

See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see also FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (“[Agencies] may not exercise [their] authority .
. . inconsistent[ly] with the administrative structure that Congress enacted . . . .”).
194

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 388 & n. 314 (citing Bergeron, supra note 28).

195

See Bergeron, supra note 28; LUKE HERRINE, AN ADMINISTRATIVE PATH TO STUDENT DEBT
CANCELLATION 11 (2019); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) (granting the Department of Education power
to “waive or release” claims “acquired” in connection with FFELP).
196

See HERRINE, supra note 203, at 11–12 (noting the Department of Education does not typically take
possession of FFELP loans unless the “debtor has been in default for many months”); 20 U.S.C. §
1087cc(a)(4) (allowing the Department of Education to obtain assignment of Perkins loans in “default”).
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FFELP loans,197 the Department’s modification and settlement authorities may not extend
beyond nonperforming loans.198 Upon an appropriate challenge, a court could conclude that
governing law creates this limitation and review the Department of Education’s forgiveness of
performing loans.199
Even if a court concluded that the HEA and FCCA granted the Department plenary
forgiveness authority, the court would likely still find “law to apply” forbidding widespread
forgiveness: since 2016, the Department of Education has bound itself—by its own regulations—
to apply the FCCS when “compromis[ing], suspend[ing], or terminat[ing] collection of a debt in
any amount” arising under FFELP, Perkins, or Direct.200 Agencies must comply with their own
regulations.201 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit, Second Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit have ruled
that regulations constitute “law to apply” in judicial review; the D.C. Circuit has extended this
principle beyond regulations to certain agency guidance.202 Department of Education regulations
may thus provide courts with a basis to review student loan forgiveness.203

197

See 20 U.S.C. § 1087a(b)(2).

198
199

See Bergeron, supra note 28.
See Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 1041, 1060–61 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

200

See 34 C.F.R. § 30.70 (2019); Herrine, supra note 16, at 381–83.

201

See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954); Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942).
202

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 361 (citing Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1550 (7th Cir. 1985);
Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Salazar v. King, 822 F.3d 61, 76–77 (2d Cir.
2016)).
203

See, e.g., HERRINE, supra note 195, at 10–11 (discussing the Department of Education regulations that
limit the Department of Education’s modification and settlement authorities). But see Herrine, supra note
16, at 379–86 (considering numerous regulations that might bind the Department of Education and
concluding none bar forgiveness of loans, particularly given that executive regulations may be altered or
rescinded).
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However, proponents of administrative student loan forgiveness argue that the
Department’s 2016 debt collection regulations are best read as posing no barrier to
administrative student loan forgiveness even in their current form. 204 Proponents stress that “the
FCCS, on their own terms, apply only when an agency is relying” on the FCCA settlement
authority and therefore do not apply to exercises of modification or settlement authority under
the HEA.205 Furthermore, proponents argue that the regulatory history of the 2016 rule suggests
that it was implemented “to reflect expansions in the Secretary’s authority,” not to limit
preexisting authority.206 In addition, proponents observe that the provision cross-referencing the
FCCS is incompatible with the FCCS rules it purports to impose, as the provision “states that the
Secretary may compromise a debt in any amount, without prescribing any procedures or
considerations for the exercise of that discretion” while the FCCS regulations “apply restrictions
on the dollar amounts and prescribe considerations and procedures that an agency must follow
before compromising a debt.”207 These arguments notwithstanding, the January 2021 Department
of Education OGC letter cited the FCCS (though not the Department of Education’s specific
regulation imposing its strictures) as “controlling regulation” obligating the Department of
Education to “aggressively collect all debts.”208 If this regulation constrains the Department of

204

See Letter to Senator Warren, supra note 26, at 5. The Department of Education is not likely to receive
much deference from a court on its interpretation of § 30.70, so these arguments would need to persuade a
court on their own merits. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–18 (2019) (citing Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)) (holding that agencies will not receive Auer deference when interpreting a
regulation unless the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous,” the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable,”
and that interpretation “implicate[s the agency’s] substantive expertise”).
205
See Letter to Senator Warren, supra note 26, at 5.
206

See id.

See id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 30.70(e) (2019)); see also Herrine, supra note 16, at 383 (“One way to treat
this regulatory change, then, is a massive drafting error. A mistake to be ignored.”).
207

208

Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 2 (citing 31 CFR §§ 901.1(a), 902.2, 902.3, 902.4).
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Education’s forgiveness authority beyond any statutory constraints, the Department may need to
amend its debt collection regulations through notice and comment rulemaking before
implementing administrative student loan forgiveness.209 Courts could review the Department’s
decision to amend those regulations but would likely extend Chevron deference.210
In addition to the risk that courts would review the Department’s student loan forgiveness
under Chaney because there is “law to apply,” courts might also review a blanket forgiveness
regime because it is “not simply a non-enforcement policy.”211 In Regents, the Supreme Court
rejected the Trump Administration’s attempt to terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) program, under which the Department of Homeland Security granted “deferred
action” to certain resident aliens otherwise subject to deportation and held that DACA was not a
discretionary nonenforcement policy committed to agency discretion under Chaney.212 The Court
explained that DACA “did not merely [involve] ‘refus[ing] to institute proceedings’ against a
particular entity, or even a particular class.” 213 Instead, the agency “‘establish[ed] a clear and
efficient process’ for identifying” eligible aliens and “solicited applications from eligible aliens,
instituted a standardized review process, and sent formal notices indicating whether the alien

209

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 381–83.

210

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); Herrine, supra
note 16, at 367.
211
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1906 (2020).
212

Id.

213

Id. (citing Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832).
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would receive . . . forbearance.”214 The Court concluded that these processes led to an
“affirmative act of approval,” not nonenforcement, and courts could thus review them.215
Here, a court could characterize the Department’s student loan forgiveness as an
“affirmative act of approval” for “forbearance,” rendering it reviewable under the APA.216 To
avoid replicating the DACA case, the Department of Education would likely at least need to
avoid establishing policies and procedures for determining loan forgiveness eligibility.217
In sum, the Department of Education has three strategic options if it opts to exercise
plenary forgiveness authority. First, the Department could assert nonenforcement discretion to
forgive student loans, interpreting the HEA as a grant of plenary forgiveness authority broad
enough to overcome the Department’s rule committing the Department to applying the FCCS.
This approach may lead a court to block administrative student loan forgiveness on the grounds
that the Department failed to comply with its own rules.218 The Department could strengthen its
case by interpreting its debt collection rule so that—the rule’s plain text notwithstanding—it
does not actually bind the Department to apply the FCCS.219 But if a court were to reject the
Department’s interpretation, the court may block the Department’s loan forgiveness because the
Department violated its own rule. However, if a court accepted the Department’s interpretation,
then the court would proceed to evaluate whether the HEA and FCCA allow the Department to

214

Id. (citation omitted).

215

Id. (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831).

216

See id.

217

See id.
See Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. at 266 (establishing doctrine that agency’s failure to comply with its
regulations to the detriment of individual rights violates due process).
218

219

See Letter to Senator Warren, supra note 26, at 5.
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exercise plenary forgiveness authority. 220 As the Department’s actions to forgive student debt
under this approach would not involve notice and comment rulemaking, the Department would
receive only minimal deference from the court in judicial review of the Department’s authority;
however, the Department could escape judicial review of its individual acts of forgiveness.221
Second, the Department could engage in notice and comment rulemaking to repeal or
amend its regulation committing it to applying the FCCS but enact no further regulation before
proceeding to widespread loan forgiveness. The change to the regulation would be reviewable,
though eligible for Chevron deference,222 while the forgiveness itself might evade judicial review
but would not benefit from much judicial deference. 223
Third and lastly, the Department of Education could engage in notice and comment
rulemaking to replace its rule committing it to applying the FCCS with a regulation asserting
plenary forgiveness authority. Courts could review this approach224 but would likely extend
Chevron deference to forgiveness actions.225

See Montana Air Chapter No. 29, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations, Auth.,
898 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1990).
220

221
222

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228–33 (2001).
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; Herrine, supra note 16, at 367.

223

See Mead, 533 U.S. at 228–33.

224

See Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1906 (2020).

225

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; Herrine, supra note 16, at 361, 367.
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C. EMERGENCY STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS UNDER THE HEROES
ACT
In addition to Department’s potential plenary forgiveness authority under the HEA, the
Department could separately rely on the HEROES Act.226 Under the HEROES Act, during a
national emergency, the Department of Education can “waive or modify any statutory or
regulatory provision applicable to” federal student loans for certain enumerated purposes,
including ensuring that “recipients of student financial assistance . . . who are affected
individuals are not placed in a worse position financially in relation to that financial assistance
because of their status as affected individuals”; “avoid[ing] inadvertent, technical violations or
defaults,” and ensuring that “no overpayment will be required to be returned or repaid.” 227 The
statute defines an “affected individual” as someone who “is serving on active duty during a war
or other military operation or national emergency”; “is performing qualifying National Guard
duty during a war or other military operation or national emergency”; “resides or is employed in
an area that is declared a disaster area by any Federal, State, or local official in connection with a
national emergency”; or “suffered direct economic hardship as a direct result of a war or other
military operation or national emergency, as determined by [the Department of Education].”228
The Department of Education “is not required to exercise the waiver or modification authority”
under the HEROES Act “on a case-by-case basis.”229

226

See HEGJI, supra note 75, at 14–16 (discussing applicability of HEROES Act to student loan relief in
context of COVID-19 national emergency).
227
228

20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 1098ee(2).

229

Id. § 1098bb(b)(3).
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The Department of Education could plausibly argue that recipients of student loan
forgiveness during the COVID-19 pandemic are “affected individuals.”230 The statute expressly
gives the Department discretion to determine that an individual “suffered direct economic
hardship as a direct result” of the COVID-19 “national emergency,” and is thus an “affected
individual.”231 The Department could likely argue that widespread forgiveness would ensure that
these “affected individuals are not placed in a worse position financially in relation to [student]
financial assistance because of their status as affected individuals.” 232
However, the January 2021 Department of Education opinion letter concluded that “plain
HEA language and context strongly suggest Congress never intended the HEROES Act as
authority for mass cancellation, compromise, discharge, or forgiveness of student loan principal
balances.”233 First, the letter construed the HEROES Act as allowing the Department of
Education to place “affected individuals” only “in the same position financially in relation to
their [HEA] Title IV loans as if the national emergency had not occurred.” 234 The letter thus
rejected the view that the Secretary could forgive loans to “ensure” affected individuals would
not be “placed in a worse position financially in relation to [student] financial assistance.” 235
Second, the letter noted that the HEROES Act mentions “defaults” and modifications of
borrowers’ obligations to return overpayments, and the letter called these references a “strong

230

Id. § 1098ee(2).

231

Id.

232

Id. § 1098bb(a)(2)(A).

233
234

Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 6.
Id.

235

See id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(a)(2)(A)).
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textual basis for concluding Congress intended loans to be repaid, even after the exercise of
HEROES Act authority.”236 Third, relying on MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,237 the letter argued that the appropriate definition of “modify” is “to change

moderately or in minor fashion.”238 The letter did not consider the technical definition of a loan
obligation “modification” in the context of federal budgeting. 239 For these three reasons, the
letter concluded that the HEROES Act would not provide independent statutory authority for
widespread student loan forgiveness.240
D. TAX TREATMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE STUDENT LOAN
FORGIVENESS
Student loan forgiveness would be counterproductive if student debtors immediately had
to pay taxes on their debt relief.241 Such tax liability, though smaller than their previous debt
burden, could be “due as a lump sum immediately, without any of the repayment plan or
forbearance options available on student loans.” 242 Thus, successful administrative student loan
forgiveness requires the Department of Education’s actions to receive favorable tax treatment.243

236

Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(a)).

237

512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994).

238

See Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 6.

239

See id. But see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 122, § 185.3(s); supra Section II.A
(discussing technical definition of modification).
240

See Department of Education Letter, supra note 27, at 6.

241

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 402.
Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(11) (including “Income from discharge of indebtedness” in taxable gross
income); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (establishing that forgiveness of
taxpayer’s debt is taxable income).
242

243

HERRINE, supra note 203, at 15–16.
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Treasury (including the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)) is an executive agency, and
the IRS has some latitude in determining, without Congressional input, that particular debt
cancellations do not constitute taxable income. 244 For example, in 2015, the IRS determined that
it could exclude from gross income the Department of Education’s forgiveness of student debt
incurred because of fraud.245 Nevertheless, until recently, IRS policies would have treated
blanket student loan forgiveness as taxable gross income. 246 For administrative forgiveness to
succeed, Treasury would have needed to change this tax treatment,247 but such a change would
be subject to challenge under the APA.248
The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, enacted March 11, 2021, provided a legislative
fix for this issue by altering the tax treatment of student loan forgiveness for the years 2021 to
2025.249 It excludes the full or partial cancellation of student loan debt from gross income,
See Herrine, supra note 16, at 404–05 & n.362 (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, PUB. NO. 970, TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION (Jan. 17, 2019)), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p970.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra, at 38 (noting cancellation of student loan indebtedness
is generally taxable gross income, but may be excludable from gross income when resulting from certain
“Student loan repayment assistance” programs); Bailey v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 88 T.C. 1293,
1300 (1987) (discussing “general welfare” exception permitting exclusion of welfare benefits from tax
treatment).
244

245

Rev. Proc. 2015-57, 2015-51 I.R.B. 863, at 864; see also Herrine, supra note 16, at 410.

246

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 244, at 38–39.

247

See Herrine, supra note 16, at 403; see also John R. Brooks, The Tax Treatment of Student Loan
Discharge and Cancellation, in DELIVERING ON DEBT RELIEF: PROPOSALS, IDEAS, AND ACTIONS TO
CANCEL STUDENT DEBT ON DAY ONE AND BEYOND 166, 174–76 (Student Borrower Prot. Ctr. et al. eds.,
2020) (arguing that student loan debt cancellation constitutes an untaxable scholarship under the Internal
Revenue Code, and that the IRS should cease treating student loan debt as cancellation of indebtedness
income).
248

See Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding APA applies to
IRS).
249
See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub L. No. 117-2, § 9675, 135 Stat. 4; Mark Kantrowitz,
Covid-19 Relief Bill Passes with Tax-Free Student Loan Forgiveness, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2021, 02:53 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markkantrowitz/2021/03/06/covid-19-relief-bill-passes-with-tax-freestudent-loan-forgiveness/?sh=528d2f7e2d1e.
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exempting it from taxation.250 However, if administrative forgiveness of student loans is not
completed by 2025 and this provision is not reenacted, Treasury would need to rely on its
administrative powers.251
IV.

VIABILITY OF A LITIGATION CHALLENGE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
FORGIVENESS OF STUDENT LOANS
This Part analyzes the prospects of a court challenge to administrative forgiveness of

student loans.
Section A examines procedural barriers that may limit potential plaintiffs’ access to the
courts. Section A first reviews the constitutional standing requirements of Article III of the
Constitution.252 It then considers the United States’ sovereign immunity, concluding that
plaintiffs’ only avenue for enjoining administrative forgiveness is a suit under § 702 of the
APA.253 It then analyzes whether the APA permits each of two plausible plaintiff classes—
student loan servicers and investors in student loan asset-backed securities—to sue the
Department of Education (to block the forgiveness of the debt) or Treasury (to require the IRS to
recognize the forgiveness as taxable income). The Section concludes that both servicers and
investors could bring APA suits against the Department of Education but not Treasury.254

250

See American Rescue Plan Act § 9675; Kantrowitz, supra note 249.

251

Concerns about the tax treatment of student loan debt were pronounced prior to the American Rescue
Plan Act’s legislative fix. See, e.g., HERRINE, supra note 203, at 15–16. Such concerns may become more
acute once again if administrative student loan forgiveness is not accomplished well before the statute’s
2025 favorable tax treatment deadline.
252

U.S. CONST. art. III.

253

5 U.S.C. § 702.
Certain potential plaintiff classes whose claims are likely not viable deserve mention.
First, a 2015 district court case suggests that the houses of Congress might have standing to
challenge administrative student loan forgiveness. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F.
Supp. 3d 53, 58 (D.D.C. 2015) (concluding House of Representatives collectively had standing to
challenge executive’s violations of Constitution’s Appropriations Clause (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
254
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Section B considers how the federal courts might resolve the merits of an APA challenge
to student loan forgiveness, including how different records of agency action might affect the
outcome. Section B also argues that federal courts would be most likely to permit partial as
opposed to blanket forgiveness of student loans, especially if the forgiveness is tied to the
exigency of a national emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic.
A. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO ENJOINING ADMINISTRATIVE
STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS
Prospective plaintiffs seeking an injunction to frustrate administrative student loan
forgiveness must establish standing to sue and that the federal government has waived sovereign
immunity with respect to their claim.

cl. 7)); see also U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2016)
(maintaining standing holding). However, this district court case appears to be the only example of its
kind. See Brief for Appellants at 1, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 16-5202 (D.C. Cir.
dismissed May 16, 2018) (“For the first time in our Nation’s history, the district court allowed one House
of Congress to invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III court to resolve a disagreement between the
political branches over the Executive Branch’s execution of a federal statute.”); see also Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811, 816, 821 (1997) (denying individual legislators standing to challenge executive line item
veto); Crawford v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 868 F.3d 438, 451, 460 (6th Cir. 2017) (denying U.S.
Senator’s legislative standing to sue Treasury for acts “not authorized by Congress through the ordinary
legislative process”).
Second, because there is a colorable argument that Congress has not appropriated funds for certain
forms of federal student loan forgiveness, executive branch employees who carry out such expenditures
could face criminal liability under the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), 1350; see Herrine, supra
note 16, at 399–400, and such employees would therefore seem like plausible plaintiffs with standing. See,
e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (noting that threat of prosecution
typically can ground Article III standing). However, federal government employees’ claims are likely to be
funneled into the employee dispute procedures of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.), which would limit employees’ remedies to those contemplated for resolving employment
disputes. See Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 2013 WL 8211660, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 31,
2013), aff’d on other grounds sub. nom. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that federal
government employees could not seek equitable relief under the APA based on choosing between violating
the law or adverse employment consequences). Federal employees may seek corrective employment action,
and possibly certain money damages, but not an injunction preventing forgiveness of student loans. See
Bohac v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 239 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing limited remedies available
to aggrieved federal employees).
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I. ARTICLE III STANDING
Any plaintiff seeking to challenge administrative student loan forgiveness must have
standing.255 Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to “Cases” and
“Controversies.”256 Under Article III, plaintiffs have standing to sue in federal court only if they
have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”257 A plaintiff
suffered an injury in fact if they suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”258 The
injury is not “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” if it is “the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court.”259 Plaintiffs have standing to seek
only those remedies that redress their constitutionally cognizable injuries in fact. 260 A plaintiff
seeking to enjoin administrative forgiveness of student loans must demonstrate an injury in fact,
fairly traceable to student loan forgiveness (if suing the Department of Education) or its tax
treatment (if suing Treasury), redressable by a favorable ruling.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In addition to Article III’s constitutional minimum of standing, “[s]overeign immunity
shields the United States from suit absent a consent to be sued that is ‘unequivocally

255

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016).

256

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.

257

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).

258

Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).

259

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).

260

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998).
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expressed.’”261 As a result, plaintiffs seeking to challenge federal government action must fit
their suits within the bounds of an unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity.262
The waiver must permit both the type of claim and the relief sought. 263
Plaintiffs seeking equitable relief from actions of an administrative agency, like the
Department of Education or Treasury, find the requisite waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702
of the APA, which waives the United States’ immunity from suits “seeking relief other than
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or
failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority.”264 However, such plaintiffs
must clear two hurdles before seeking equitable relief under the APA. First, plaintiffs may not
access the § 702 waiver of sovereign immunity “if any other statute that grants consent to suit
expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”265 This caveat “prevents plaintiffs
from exploiting the APA’s waiver to evade limitations on suit contained in other statutes.”266
APA claims must challenge agency action “for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court.”267 Second, the APA imposes a “statutory” or “prudential” standing 268 requirement in

261

United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 9 (2012) (citation omitted).

262

See Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and Money
Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 602 (2003).
263

See C. Stanley Dees, The Executive Branch as Penelope: Preserving the Tapestry of SovereignImmunity Waivers for Suits Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 708, 710–11 (2003).
264

5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).

265

Id.

266

Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 215 (2012).

267

5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018).

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127–28 & n.4 (2014) (explaining
that the zone-of-interests tests is not jurisdictional and rests on “statutory, not ‘prudential,’
268
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addition to Article III’s constitutional standing requirements: “[t]he interest [the plaintiff] asserts
must be ‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute’ that
[the plaintiff] says was violated.”269 While the zone of interest test “is not meant to be especially
demanding” and does not require “indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be
plaintiff,” the zone of interest test “denies a right of review if the plaintiff’s interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” 270 A plaintiff seeking
equitable relief under the APA from administrative forgiveness of student debt must show that
no statute “expressly or impliedly forbids”271 such relief and that the plaintiff is within the zone
of interests of whichever statute the plaintiff argues constrains the Department of Education or
Treasury.272
Other available waivers of sovereign immunity are unlikely to permit plaintiffs to
frustrate administrative forgiveness of student loans. Under the Tucker Act, 273 the United States
waived sovereign immunity for suits in the Court of Federal Claims for money damages founded
“upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated

considerations,” though the Court “admittedly ha[s] placed that test under the ‘prudential’ [standing]
rubric in the past.”).
269
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band, 567 U.S. at 224 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
270

Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987).

271

5 U.S.C. § 702.

272

See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band, 567 U.S. at 224.

273

Tucker Act of 1887, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491.

144

damages in cases not sounding in tort.”274 Similarly, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 275 the
United States waived sovereign immunity for certain suits for money damages sounding in
tort.276 However, these waivers do not permit suits for equitable relief, as would be required to
prevent administrative student loan forgiveness.277 The United States has also waived sovereign
immunity for suits by federal government employees based on adverse employment actions. 278
Nonetheless, the remedial framework for such suits includes merely corrective actions related to
the adverse employment action and certain money damages, not the sort of equitable relief
required to block administrative student loan forgiveness.279 While none of these non-APA
waivers of sovereign immunity suffice for plaintiffs seeking to block administrative student loan
forgiveness, they represent “other statute[s] that grant consent to suit [and] expressly or
impliedly forbid[]” APA equitable relief where they apply. 280
In sum, plaintiffs seeking equitable relief to prevent administrative forgiveness of
student loans must demonstrate they have Article III standing, no statute waiving sovereign
immunity other than the APA applies to their claims, and they fall within the zone of interests of
the statute they allege the Department of Education or Treasury has violated. The following

274

Id. § 1491.

275
276

Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680.
See id.

277

See Sisk, supra note 262, at 603.

278

See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7701; Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5
U.S.C. § 1221; see also Frazier v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 154–55, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
279

See Bohac v. Department of Agriculture, 239 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing limited
remedies available to aggrieved federal employees).
280

See 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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section considers whether each of two potential plaintiff classes—student loan servicers and
investors in student loan asset-based securities—could meet these requirements.
III. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO SUITS BY STUDENT LOAN
SERVICERS
Student loan forgiveness would likely cut into the profits of federal student loan
servicers. The federal government paid federal student loan servicers $830 million in Fiscal Year
2019.281 That expenditure is likely to grow to $1.149 billion in Fiscal Year 2021. 282 As servicers’
revenues depend on servicing volume, forgiveness of student loans and the concomitant
reduction in the volume of student loans to service would hurt servicers’ bottom line.283
Student loan servicers would likely clear all procedural hurdles to bringing an APA suit
for equitable relief against the Department of Education. Student loan servicers could likely
show that they meet Article III’s constitutional minimum of standing; that, though they are
government contractors, the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does
not preclude APA relief; and that they fall within the zone of interests of the Higher Education
Act284 pursuant to which the Department of Education administers federal student loan programs.
However, student loan servicers likely could not bring an APA suit against Treasury, as servicers

281

OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2021,
DETAILED BUDGET ESTIMATES 363 (2020) https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2021APP/pdf/BUDGET-2021-APP.pdf.
282

Id.
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See Naimon et al., supra note 2, at 272 (citing Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. Servicing
Contract No. ED-FSA-09-D-0012, OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, 13–14 (2009),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/foia/contract/greatlakes-061709.pdf [hereinafter Great Lakes
Contract]).
284

Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 431, 79 Stat. 1219, 1245.
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would likely lack Article III standing and fall outside of the zone of interests of the relevant
sections of the Internal Revenue Code. 285
In a suit challenging the Department of Education’s authority to forgive student loan
debts, student loan servicers that service those debts under contracts with the federal government
would likely be able to seek equitable relief under the APA that could block debt forgiveness. 286
First, servicers would be able to demonstrate Article III standing. The Supreme Court
has recognized that “actual financial injury” from “illegally reducing the return on [plaintiffs’]
investments” establishes an injury in fact for the purposes of Article III standing.287 Here, the
servicers receive payment on a per loan basis, 288 so administrative student loan forgiveness, if
unlawful, would inflict “actual financial injury” on the servicers and “illegally reduc[e]”
servicers’ return on investment. 289 That injury would be fairly traceable to the challenged
Department of Education action because the harmful reduction in loan servicing volume would
be the direct result of the Department of Education’s action forgiving those debts, rather than

285

See infra, text at notes 312–24.

286
287

See infra, text at notes 287–310.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 665 (1990).

288

See Naimon et al., supra note 2, at 272.

289

Franchise Tax Bd., 493 U.S. at 665. Administrative student loan forgiveness may also raise the specter
of a “regulatory taking” under the Fifth Amendment by interfering with the “investment-backed
expectations” of participants in the federal student loan industry, such as servicers. See Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331
F.3d 1319, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding revisions to government’s low-income housing program that
impaired 96% of value of investments of private actors in that government program was a regulatory
taking under Penn Central). However, publicly available government student loan servicing contracts
state that the government “makes no guarantee” that servicers “will retain their current loan servicing
volume” or a “minimum volume,” Great Lakes Contract, supra note 283, at 13–14, likely defeating
claims that parties have an investment-backed expectation of a certain loan volume. See Cienega
Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1334.
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“the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.”290 And the injury
would likely be redressable by a favorable ruling 291 because the APA likely authorizes the
equitable relief required to preserve the volume of student loans for servicing. 292
Second, servicers would be able to bring an APA claim seeking equitable relief even
though servicers are government contractors, and the Tucker Act precludes certain equitable
claims by government contractors. 293 However, servicers could not restrain administrative
student loan forgiveness through an action sounding in breach of contract.294 Plaintiffs may not
bring such actions under the APA, but must bring them under the Tucker Act—solely for money
damages.295 Nevertheless, courts have rejected the view that “any case requiring some reference
to or incorporation of a contract is necessarily on the contract and therefore directly within the
Tucker Act.”296 Though servicers are government contractors, the APA remedy contemplated
here is distinguishable from a suit for specific performance of a government contract.

290

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).

291

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016).

292

See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (permitting equitable relief for unlawful agency action). Servicers would have
standing to seek only those equitable remedies that would actually redress their injuries, such as a
preliminary injunction preventing loan forgiveness. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 107 (1998). For example, they would likely not have standing to seek a post hoc declaratory judgment
that student loan forgiveness was unlawful, as such a declaration would not redress servicers’ injuries so
long as the debts are not reinstated. See id.
293
See Sisk, supra note 262, at 628–629 (“The District Courts . . . lack authority to order specific
performance by negative implication from the Tucker Act.”); see also Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d
959, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“An award of specific performance . . . , as a matter of public policy, is not
available against the government.”).
See Int’l Eng’g Co., Div. of A-T-O v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 573, 577 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(explaining that equitable relief is not available in cases governed by the Tucker Act).
294
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See Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1524 (1986).

296

Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 971.
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In Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, the D.C. Circuit confronted whether a government
contractor’s claim for equitable relief under the APA based on a government contract fell within
the Tucker Act.297 Government contractor Megapulse, Inc. alleged that the Coast Guard violated
the Trade Secrets Act298 when it removed restrictions against commercial use of Megapulse’s
proprietary data. Megapulse supplied the Coast Guard “pursuant to the terms of various
contracts.”299 The government argued that because Megapulse’s allegations would state a claim
for breach of Megapulse’s government contracts, an “adequate remedy” was available under the
Tucker Act for breach of contract; thus, § 704 of the APA precluded Megapulse’s suit under §
702 for an injunction.300 The court declined to credit this argument, rejecting the view “that an
agency action may not be enjoined, even if in clear violation of a specific statute, simply because
that same action might also amount to a breach of contract.”301 The court observed that such a
rule would permit the government to evade legal requirements simply by contracting not to
violate them and thereby limit suits for violations to a Tucker Act money damages remedy. 302
As in Megapulse, servicers seeking to enjoin student loan forgiveness would not be
bringing “a disguised contract action”303 merely because the cause of their injury would be a
diminution in the value of their government contracts. A suit alleging that it is unlawful for the
Department of Education to forgive student debts at all would not sound in breach of contract
297

See id. at 966.

298

18 U.S.C. § 1905.

299
300

Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 962–64.
Id. at 970.

301

Id. at 971.

302

Id.

303

Id. at 968.
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even if the acts would also breach the servicers’ contracts. 304 Student loan servicers could
therefore bring such a suit under the APA, notwithstanding their status as government
contractors, and obtain equitable relief.
Third, student loan servicers likely fall within the zone of interests of the HEA.305 The
zone of interest test “is not meant to be especially demanding,” and merely weeds out plaintiffs
whose “interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the
statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” 306 The
Higher Education Act expressly contemplates student loan servicers.307 Subchapter IV of the
Higher Education Act, which includes the federal student loan programs, 308 commands the
Secretary of Education to “obtain public involvement in the development of proposed regulations
for this subchapter” including “individuals and representatives of the groups involved in student
financial assistance programs under this subchapter, such as . . . loan servicers.”309 Moreover,
these groups, including loan servicers, are to be participants in “a negotiated rulemaking
process” before the Secretary of Education “publish[es] proposed regulations in the Federal
Register.”310 This express statutory mandate to include student loan servicers and their interests

304

See id. at 971. Separately, servicers could also bring a claim for money damages sounding in breach of
contract, within the ambit of the Tucker Act, seeking compensation for the drop in loan volume. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491.
305

See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-329, § 431, 79 Stat. 1219, 1245; see also Hunt, supra
note 10, at 1190.
306
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987).
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See 20 U.S.C. § 1098a(a)(1); Hunt, supra note 10, at 1190 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1098a(a)(1)).
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20 U.S.C. Ch. 28, Subch. IV.
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20 U.S.C. § 1098a(a)(1).

310

Id.
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in the administration of the federal student loan programs easily satisfies the zone of interest
test.311
In sum, student loan servicers could sue to prevent the Department of Education from
forgiving student loans. Servicers could demonstrate an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the
Department’s forgiveness of student loans, and redressable by equitable relief under § 702 of the
APA. The Tucker Act would not preclude relief, and servicers fall within the zone of interests of
the HEA.
Notwithstanding the viability of a servicer suit against the Department of Education,
servicers would likely be unable to bring a similar APA action against Treasury for its tax
treatment of student loan forgiveness. Servicers would likely neither have Article III standing nor
satisfy the zone of interests test in a suit against Treasury. As a result, servicers’ potential
challenge to administrative student loan forgiveness would hinge on the merits of its case against
the Department of Education; servicers would not be able to deter the President with the threat of
forcing any student loan forgiveness to incur unfavorable tax treatment.
First, servicers would likely not have Article III standing to sue Treasury. While student
loan forgiveness, particularly the Department of Education actions already discussed, would
inflict a constitutionally cognizable injury on servicers,312 that injury would be neither fairly
traceable to Treasury’s actions nor redressable by an injunction preventing or reversing those
actions. To the extent that tax treatment of student loan forgiveness would injure servicers, it

311

But see Jack V. Hoover, Standing and Student Loan Cancellation, 108 VA. L. REV. ONLINE _, at 12-15
(forthcoming 2022) (arguing that student loan servicers, as third parties who merely have “a financial
interest in the mechanism of a statutory regime’s execution,” would fall outside the zone of interests of
the HEA, and noting that 20 U.S.C. § 1082 itself does not “contain any requirement to consider effects on
the debtor, let alone third parties relying on the debtor’s existence”).
312
See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 665 (1990).
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would do so by making student loan forgiveness tenable for the Department of Education.313 In
the absence of favorable tax treatment, the policy objectives of student loan forgiveness would
be frustrated to the point where the Department of Education would be unlikely to pursue it. 314
That injury depends on “the result of the independent action of some third party”315—the
Department of Education—and would not be fairly traceable to Treasury. 316 Moreover, because a
court order interdicting Treasury’s favorable tax treatment of forgiven student loans would not
itself affect servicers’ losses, which would be a product of the volume of loans the Department of
Education forgives, such an order would not redress servicers’ injuries. 317 Thus, servicers would
likely lack Article III standing to sue Treasury over student loans’ tax treatment.
Second, student loan servicers are unlikely to be within the zone of interests of the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code relevant to tax treatment of student loan forgiveness.
Courts applying the zone of interest test to suits alleging violations of the Internal Revenue Code
ask whether the plaintiff falls within the zone of interests of the challenged section of the code,
rather than the whole Code, as “the Code is intended to accomplish a wide variety of economic
and social goals and purposes.”318 If plaintiffs were permitted “to transfer the Congressional
purpose and intent embodied in one section of the Code into other contexts and situations
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See Herrine, supra note 16, at 402.
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See id.
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Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).
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See id.; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984) (holding effect on public schools of tax treatment of
private schools was not fairly traceable to IRS), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
317
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 105 (1998) (holding redressability is not met
where “[n]one of the specific items of relief sought, and none that we can envision as ‘appropriate’ under
the general request, would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused”).
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Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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regulated by different provisions of the Code, the possibilities for litigation would indeed be
endless.”319 Here, the relevant portions of the code are Section 61(a)(11), 320 which defines gross
income to include “income from discharge of indebtedness,” and the exceptions to Section
61(a)(11) set out in Section 108(a)(1).321 Section 61(a)(11) codified the rule of the Supreme
Court’s 1931 decision in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.322 As a codification of a preexisting
federal common law doctrine relating to tax treatment of forgiveness of any kind of debt, Section
61(a)(11) is “so marginally related to” the interests of student loan servicers “that it cannot
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” 323 Likewise, none of the
Section 108(a)(1) exceptions are related to student loan servicing. 324 Student loan servicers
would therefore be unlikely to fall within the zone of interests of the relevant provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code and would be unable to sue Treasury under § 702 of the APA.
In sum, student loan servicers would not have standing to sue Treasury over its tax
treatment of student loans, even though servicers could likely sue the Department of Education
for equitable relief from the forgiveness itself.
IV. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO SUITS BY INVESTORS
In addition to student loan servicers, private investors in public student loans would likely
lose money if those loans were forgiven. A substantial portion of outstanding FFELP debt is

319

Id.
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26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(11).
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26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1); see Martin J. McMahon & Daniel L. Simmons, A Field Guide to Cancellation
of Debt Income, 63 TAX LAW. 415, 419 (2010).
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United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); see McMahon & Simmons, supra note 321, at
419.
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Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987).
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securitized,325 and holders of these FFELP asset-backed securities (FFELP ABS) could see their
investments lose value if President Biden proceeds with student debt forgiveness.326
Like student loan servicers, investors in FFELP ABS can likely sue the Department of
Education, but not Treasury, based on impairment to their securities investments. 327 Investors in
FFELP ABS likely would have Article III standing to sue the Department of Education, and they
would likely fall within the zone of interests of the Higher Education Act. However, investors
would be unlikely to establish Article III standing to sue Treasury, and they are unlikely to fall
within the zone of interests of the relevant portions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Investors in FFELP ABS could likely establish Article III standing to sue the Department
of Education because they would be injured by forgiveness of the loans underlying their
securities.328 Like the injury to loan servicers, this “actual financial injury” from “illegally
reducing the return on [plaintiffs’] investments” establishes an injury in fact for the purposes of
Article III standing.329 That injury is likely fairly traceable to the Department of Education’s
forgiving FFELP loans, as the cessation of cash flows from student loan borrowers would impair
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See, e.g., Fitch Revises Outlooks to Negative on US FFELP Student Loan Trusts following Sovereign
Revision, FITCH RATINGS (Aug. 6, 2020, 5:46 PM), https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structuredfinance/fitch-revises-outlooks-to-negative-on-us-ffelp-student-loan-trusts-following-sovereign-revision06-08-2020.
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the collateral supporting the investors’ securities.330 And it is redressable because the APA
authorizes the equitable relief required to prevent this collateral impairment. 331
Furthermore, investors in FFELP ABS are likely “within the zone of interests” of the
Higher Education Act. 332 The list of “groups involved in student financial assistance programs”
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act includes—in addition to “loan servicers”—
“secondary markets.”333 This reference to “secondary markets” in student loans, while not as on
point as the reference to “loan servicers,” suggests investor interests are “arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.”334
In contrast, an investor suit against Treasury for its tax treatment of student loan
forgiveness would likely fail for the same reasons as a servicer suit. Because both servicers and
investors would allege similar injuries based on the dissipation of student loans, neither has an
injury fairly traceable to tax treatment nor redressable by an interdiction of tax treatment. 335
Furthermore, investors are even less likely than servicers to come within the zone of interests of
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Sections 61(a)(11) and 108(a)(1), which concern tax treatment for forgiveness of debt, not the
value of securities that depend on the existence of such debt for their value.336 Thus, investors in
FFELP ABS can likely bring the same claims as loan servicers: they could sue the Department of
Education, but not Treasury.
In sum, at least two plaintiff classes—student loan servicers and investors in FFELP
ABS—likely could reach the merits of an APA challenge to the Department of Education’s
administrative student loan forgiveness. That window is likely wide enough for determined
plaintiffs to tie up administrative student loan forgiveness in the courts. Section B of this Part
considers how the federal courts might receive the merits of such an APA challenge.
B. APA JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S
AND TREASURY’S STUDENT DEBT FORGIVENESS ACTIONS
If administrative student debt forgiveness is not an unreviewable exercise of the
Department of Education’s enforcement discretion, courts may subject the Department’s
forgiveness, as well as Treasury’s tax treatment of the forgiveness, to judicial review under the
APA.337 In an APA challenge, the Department of Education or Treasury would need to defend
the processes under which they promulgated student loan forgiveness 338 and demonstrate that
none of the constituent decisions comprising administrative student loan forgiveness were
“arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.” 339
APA review complicates the interplay between the Department of Education’s decision
to forgive student loan debt and Treasury’s decision not to tax that debt. Agencies may fail

336
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“arbitrary and capricious”340 review when their proffered reasons for their decisions are
“contrived.”341 In Department of Commerce, the Supreme Court invalidated the U.S. Department
of Commerce’s decision to add a question concerning citizenship status to the 2020 census,
solely because the reason the agency provided for this decision was “incongruent with what the
record reveal[ed] about the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process.”342
Under Department of Commerce, administrative student loan forgiveness would likely
fail APA review if the reasons that the Department of Education and Treasury offer for their
actions conflict with “what the record reveals about [the Department of Education’s and
Treasury’s] priorities and decisionmaking process,”343 especially if the Department of Education
and Treasury offer incompatible reasons for their concerted actions.344 For example, if the
Department of Education were to claim that it is forgiving student debt to improve the efficiency
of the student loan program,345 but Treasury were to justify not taxing this cancellation of
indebtedness income because the forgiveness represented a “general welfare benefit[],”346 a court
may find that these conflicting reasons for actions in furtherance of the same program were
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“contrived.”347 Notably, the risk that Treasury will need to offer a reason that conflicts with the
Department of Education’s reason has been mitigated, if not eliminated, by the American Rescue
Plan Act of 2021’s exclusion from gross income for the years 2021 to 2025 of the full or partial
cancellation of student loan debt. 348
Administrative student loan forgiveness is most likely to survive arbitrary and capricious
review if it is partial, not comprehensive, and faithfully executes Congress’s grant of authority to
dispose of property of the United States. 349 Under current Department regulations, the
Department has incorporated the FCCS as its standards for when a compromise is permissible. 350
Courts may find a complete abandonment of these standards to be arbitrary and capricious. 351
The Department could more easily justify liberalizing the strictures of the FCCS, such as by
lowering the bar for borrowers to obtain compromises based on inability to pay.352 Forgiveness
based on special circumstances may also encounter less resistance. For example, on March 25,
2020, in advance of congressional action, the Department of Education announced it would
“refund approximately $1.8 billion in offsets” on student debt “due to the COVID-19 national

347
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emergency.”353 This limited administrative relief more comfortably fits within the Department of
Education’s power to modify or settle student loan claims than comprehensive forgiveness.354
V.

CONCLUSION
Administrative forgiveness of student loan debt may be legal, but it faces myriad legal

obstacles, any one of which might derail the program. An administration considering pursuing
such a plan should proceed with caution, recognizing that if the Court concludes that such a
program violates the Appropriations Clause, the loan forgiveness may be unwound, and wouldbe beneficiaries may find themselves again owing crisis-level debts to the federal government.355
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